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Education and Growth:  
What Links for Which Policy? 
Jean Luc Demeulemeester & Claude Diebolt ∗ 
Abstract: »Bildung und Wachstum: Welche Verbindungen für welche Poli-
tik?«. The relation between education and growth is not an easy topic. At the 
turn of the century a vague of skepticism reawaked due to empirical evidence 
concerning a weak link between education and growth in the developed coun-
tries. A new emerging literature on the political economy of educational re-
forms should help economists in the design of policies that are both optimal 
(conducive to growth) and politically acceptable. 
Keywords: education, growth, economic policy. 
Introduction 
The contribution of education to economic growth could appear at first sight as 
one of the most well-established causal link in economics. It is not actually that 
true. Around the turn of the century, a real scepticism arose concerning the 
contribution of education to economic prosperity, followed by a counter-
offensive of new theoretical ideas. There is a real debate. If on the one side a 
series of policy papers nourished by new trends in the growth literature (as the 
new so-called neo-Schumpeterian approaches, see Aghion and Howitt, 1998) 
supported the idea that our higher education systems should be mobilised in 
order to foster economic growth and economic competitiveness (see the Sapir 
report, 2003 or the Aghion and Cohen report in France, 2004), other papers 
developed a more sceptical view (Pritchett, 2001; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). 
The aim of this short survey is to shed light on this complicated debate, the 
more so that the more sceptical arguments have received widespread attention 
and media coverage (at least in the UK) through the publication of books popu-
larising some aspects of the debate (as Myths about Education and Growth, by 
Wolf, 2002). If one considers the history of economic thought (or economic 
ideas), it is clear that those debates are not new. As put forward by Blaug 
(1985) during the 80s, phases of optimism alternated with phases of pessimism 
regarding the relation between education and growth. This is the reason why in 
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the first part of this paper we propose a rapid survey of the main ideas that one 
can find in the last 200 years of economic thought, before turning to the more 
contemporary debates, both theoretical (variations on the theme of endogenous 
growth theory) and empirical. The latter are especially important as they have 
jeopardized the theoretical consensus on the mechanical link between educa-
tion and growth. We will particularly analyse the most recent ideas developed 
by economic theoreticians about the growth processes, i.e. the so-called Neo-
Schumpeterian approach. In this view, higher education receives a key role in 
explaining sustained growth rates in the most developed economies (close to 
the technological frontier, assimilated to the US economy). Those theories (that 
seem empirically validated, see Vandenbussche, Meghir et Aghion, 2006) tend 
to modify the traditional viewpoint of economists, as their traditional growth 
theories led too easily to the same policy recommendations for all countries 
irrespective of their level of economic development (“one size fits all poli-
cies”). The Neo-Schumpeterian approaches tend to show that the optimal edu-
cation policy (and other policies as well) vary depending on the level of eco-
nomic and technological development proxied by the distance to the 
technological frontier. These theories formalise a message already well known 
by economic historians (Mitch, 1990) and can reconcile the mixed empirical 
evidence concerning the link between education and economic prosperity put 
forward by the recent studies. Last but not least, we also try in this paper to 
cover the literature on educational reforms (the political economy of educa-
tional reforms). It is not indeed sufficient for economists to determine the op-
timal education policies to foster growth; it is also necessary to understand the 
conditions which will ensure that those (supposedly) optimal policies will be 
adopted. The partial failure of the Lisbon agenda in several European countries 
(but not all of them, see the counter-example of Scandinavian countries) should 
lead us to think more carefully about the actual behaviour of policy makers. 
1. A Rapid Overview of the Main Ideas  
Concerning the Link between Education and  
Growth in the History of Economic Ideas (1700-1914) 
Sometimes, policy debates and actual policies are well in advance of economic 
theorisation. It was particularly true during the 18th century and early 19th 
century. During the 18th century, enlightened despots of Prussia (for example) 
fostered the migration of qualified craftsmen (as Protestants and Jews expelled 
from catholic countries), showing their awareness of the key importance of 
human resources, of skills and competencies in promoting their economic 
development (and by the way their political power). In the economic literature 
per se, the concept of human capital, its analogy with the concept of physical 
capital, its link with the wage level and the level of economic development, 
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appeared during the 17th and 18th century as well. William Petty, a mercantil-
ist author, suggested a very simple way of assessing the economic value of 
human life through the sum of incomes earned along the active life (as a proxy 
for production), in order to assess the loss incurred by the death of English 
soldiers. More centrally, Adam Smith (1776), in his famous Wealth of Nations, 
exposed the formal analogy between the investment in human and physical 
capital, and presented education as one form of investment increasing future 
productivity (and therefore wages) but incurring costs to acquire it. Even if 
historians of economic thought diverge on this point, one can suggest that 
Adam Smith implicitly put forward the two basic ideas of the theory of invest-
ment in human capital that will be formalised some 200 years later: the role of 
education and training as determinants of individual productivity and by the 
way incomes; and implicitly, through aggregation, their roles as determinants 
of the wealth of nations (even if Smith also stressed that the passage from 
craftsmanship to manufacture was accompanied by a process of deskilling of 
average workers). Besides this first intuition coming from the Classical School 
of Political Economy and assimilating human capital (acquired through educa-
tion and training) to a mere factor of production (as the physical capital), open-
ing the way to those approaches of economic growth stressing the role of the 
accumulation of human capital in driving the growth process, another view 
emerged at the beginning of the 19th century. Put forward by Prussian bureau-
crats dealing with the reform of the national education system after the defeat 
of 1806-1807, it stressed the importance of the stock of human capital itself on 
the capacity of the population to adopt and assimilate new technologies. After 
its defeat in 1807, Prussia launched a vast array of reforms, in order to modern-
ise its economy (its backwardness was viewed as one cause of the military 
defeat) (Gispen, 1989). Concerning education, if the actual reforms put in prac-
tice after 1815 did not make justice of the fruitfulness and variety of ideas put 
forward during this period, it is nevertheless interesting to stress the modernity 
of the debates at the time, echoing very contemporary concerns. First, Prussian 
bureaucrats saw a link between military defeat, economic backwardness and 
low levels of education (especially for the mass of the population). Too rigid 
regulations were accused of hampering the development of the economy as 
well as too an elitist system of education (and too far away from the sciences 
and useful knowledge). For the Prussian reformers an institutional re-design 
was necessary and only the State could engineer it (one can find here the idea 
of institutional path-dependence, making abrupt change difficult, even if insti-
tutions are ill-designed; see North, 1990). They thought that a curriculum re-
form was urgently needed, and that natural sciences and technology should 
receive more weight in order to foster adoption of new technologies and inno-
vation. They also stressed the importance of democratising access to the educa-
tional system in order to promote economic efficiency. The conjunction of a 
very classically educated élite with a mass of the population either not or ill-
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educated (ignorance of sciences and techniques) led (for them) to economic 
and military backwardness. A Prussian official, Kunth, clearly summarised the 
main points of this argumentation in a Report published in 1816: On the Edu-
cation of the Manufacturing and Trading Class (Gispen, 1989). He stressed the 
need to close the gap between the education of the mass of active citizens 
working in the economy and the one received by the élite, to change the cur-
riculum, making it less centred around the Classics and more centred around 
the natural sciences, as well as making it more open to everybody. Democrati-
sation of secondary education and curriculum reform should help in restoring 
economic prosperity. They even put forward the idea of creating institutions 
aimed at favouring the linkage between educational institutions and the econ-
omy, and favouring the transformation of technological innovations into mar-
ketable products (all this well before the take-off of the Prussian economy). 
These ideas were however well in advance to the Zeitgeist (especially after 
1815, when the French defeat led to an anti-utilitarian bias in educational pol-
icy, with the development of the Gymnasium and the Humboldtian university, 
as well as to an elitist one – the more so that the Prussian State was considera-
bly indebted and had few means to foster a full democratisation of secondary 
education) as well as to the actual state of the Prussian economy (take-off not 
before 1820-1830). It is nevertheless interesting to stress the novelty of the 
ideas put forward at the time. 
During the 19th century, few innovations emerged concerning the analysis 
of the link between education and growth. List (1910, 2nd ed.) nevertheless 
introduced the key role of education (in relation with the manpower require-
ments of a nascent industry) and (targeted) migrations (needs for new skills and 
competencies not yet developed at home), besides the setting up of a sufficient 
market size through a marked development of transportation networks (rail-
ways), a German custom Union, i.e. a trade policy in line with a volunteering 
industrial policy (setting up of a strong industrial basis through a transitory 
period of protectionism, i.e. infant-industry argument), in his proposed reme-
dies to allow a backward economy (he meant Germany) to catch up with a 
highly developed one (he meant UK). A decade later, Marx also innovated by 
stressing the heterogeneity of labour force (simple and complex labour, i.e. 
skilled and unskilled), as well as a modelling exercise of the production of 
skilled manpower through the use (as inputs) of skilled and unskilled labour 
(Marx, 1976, 3rd ed. in French). We find here a remote forerunner of the hu-
man capital production function. With the emergence of the Neo-Classical 
School of Economics (after 1870), the interest for growth issue declined mark-
edly. If some English neo-classical authors as Marshall were in favour of pub-
lic subsidies for education (he saw some key linked externalities), they never-
theless did not see the concept of human capital as fruitful. Even more, some 
economists will in 1914 tend to consider education as a mere (durable) con-
sumption goods (Wicksell…), implying causality links running from income to 
 327
education rather than the reverse. The period of the so-called 30-years war 
(1914-1945) with its succession of wars and economic crises was not really 
favourable to concerns for the long run (and therefore not for the contribution 
of education to economic growth). One should nevertheless note that some 
works were carried out concerning the links between education and the labour 
market (unemployment of graduates), as well as new thinking and modelling 
perspectives on growth.  
2. The 50s and the 60s: a Period of Optimism  
Regarding the Contribution of Education 
The 50s were characterized in economics by the re-emergence of growth analy-
ses and the development of human capital theory. In 1956 Solow (and Swan) 
introduced the neo-classical model of economic growth that echoed in a sense 
the Ricardian model: a model with accumulation of factors of production, de-
creasing returns with ultimately the end of the per capita growth. Only an exo-
genously determined growth rate of technological progress can support sus-
tained long run growth rate (the saving behavior affecting only the level of 
output per capita). The following year, Solow (1957) complemented this theo-
retical breakthrough with an empirical methodology called growth-accounting 
approach (grounded on the same assumptions as the theoretical model, i.e. two 
costly factors of production, labour and capital, the other ones not being paid1; 
factors of production remunerated at their marginal product), that led econo-
mists to become aware of the fact that only a small part of the growth progress 
could be attributed to the growth of factors conventionally measured. A growth 
residual will be interpreted in various ways (exogenous technological progress, 
but also education…), not always with a high degree of rigor (not to speak of 
measurement errors). The specific historical context, besides the mere internal 
evolution of the economic thought, played certainly a key role in the new 
awareness of the importance of these other determinants of growth. In a Cold 
War period characterized by the ideological conflict and competition between 
two antagonist blocks and also conflicting views on how to best organize pro-
ductive activities to generate material well-being, the early Soviet successes in 
the spatial race (Sputnik, 1958) led Western leaders to become aware of the key 
importance of large amounts of human resources trained in technology. The 
large-scale mobilization of the skills of the population in the context of a 
planned economy seemed to pay off. Empirical researches also led economists 
to stress the link between education, productivity and wages (see Mincer, 1958 
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take this point into account. 
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and the first attempts to measure the rate of return of educational investments). 
More directly linked with growth issue, Schultz (1961, 1963) will stress the 
importance of the quality (education) of the manpower in the process of eco-
nomic development (idea that education will matter the more so that the overall 
macro-environment is changing, because education increases decision-making 
abilities as well as the ability to learn new things). He especially showed that in 
the case of agricultural workforce in LDC’s. But it is Gary Becker (1964) that 
will first formalize explicitly the notion of investment in human capital (with 
analogy with investment in physical capital, as Smith did in 1776), using the 
tools of the modern microeconomics. Human capital can be defined as all the 
skills, competencies, knowledge and abilities embedded in individuals and 
allowing them to be more productive. The latter can be acquired either formally 
(through education) or informally (experience, learning by doing), voluntarily 
(it is the main assumption of many models) or involuntarily (in the case of 
learning while doing, role of experience). This investment incurs a cost (fore-
gone earnings and direct costs) but will increase individual productivity, and by 
the way the level of earnings. By aggregation it will lead to higher national 
product (growth). This concept of human capital was first used to account for 
many stylized facts in labor economics (determinants of earnings, people with 
higher degrees earning more money; hierarchy of wages depending on the level 
of education, i.e. accumulated human capital, concave age-earnings profile, 
income distribution; see Mincer, 1958; Ben-Porath, 1967), but also in the grow-
ing growth theory literature (Arrow, 1962; Uzawa, 1965; Nelson and Phelps, 
1966). We can find in the latter, already in the 60s, the main debate that will 
dominate the profession during the 90s, for example the respective role of the 
stock or the growth of the stock of human capital in the growth processes. A 
large empirical literature developed also the growth-accounting methodology 
put forward by Solow (1957) and contributed to establish a widespread belief 
in the key role of residual factors (technological progress, education) in ex-
plaining growth performances (see Denison, 1967; Jorgenson and Griliches, 
1967; Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1992; for more recent surveys see Maddison, 
2001, 2007). All these developments certainly contributed to diffuse a strong 
belief that education constituted a key necessary condition to sustained eco-
nomic growth especially in rapidly evolving and highly-technologically devel-
oped economies, but also in LDC’s. All this theoretical and empirical literature 
as well as the political context of rivalry with the Soviet-Union led during the 
60s to a large consensus regarding the need to largely expand education sys-
tems with massive expenses of public funds. Firms expected a better trained 
and more productive workforce, young people hope to benefit from higher 
wages and an upward social mobility while the States believed that the massive 
public investments will pay off later on in terms of higher growth (and taxes in 
systems where progressive tax rates were widespread). The level of public 
expenditures devolved to education (as well as the percentage of a class age 
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going on with higher levels of education) continually increased during the 60s. 
In Western countries there was a massive expansion of higher education. 
3. The “black 70s”: Years of Skepticism 
As soon as the early 70s, a vague of skepticism regarding the economic and 
social benefits of this massive expansion of educational systems emerged in a 
context of economic crisis (especially after 1973 and the first oil shock). In a 
context of declining growth rates (they halved after 1973, from 4-4,5% to 2%), 
the massive investments of the 60s did not seem to have paid off as expected. 
Unemployment rose everywhere in the West, including among graduates, to the 
point that some authors as Freeman wrote about the “overeducated American” 
(Freeman, 1976). Doubts emerged about the relevance of such educational 
investments. Empirical studies as those carried out by Psacharopoulos (1980, 
1981, 1985) at the World Bank, tended to show that the private rates of invest-
ment were systematically superior to the social ones (regarding higher educa-
tion). More theoretical analyses embodied these concerns in the hardcore of 
economic theory. Growth analyses faced a slowdown – economists turning 
rather more towards the analysis of cycles in academic markets2 (Freeman, 
1971, 1976). In these analyses, it is not only the level of education that affects 
wages but also expected wages that influence educational (and career) choices. 
Other researches, echoing sociological debates (as the credential theses), 
tended to view education as a screening device (Arrow, 1973) or more simply 
as a signal of pre-existing productivity (education here is not assumed produc-
tive, as was the case in the human capital theory), that candidates for jobs can 
acquire to get better chances on the job markets in a context of asymmetric 
information between employers (hiring candidates) and prospective employees 
(Spence, 1973, 1974). In such models, education could perfectly be demanded 
while it involved private benefits but without any social benefits (unless one 
assumes that one cannot find a less costly way of identifying productive indi-
viduals). It is also interesting to note that a concomitant skepticism emerged 
among sociologists concerning the virtues of education in reducing social ine-
qualities. Various approaches (more holist and socio-linguistic as Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1970, or more systemic as Boudon, 1972) tended to show instead that 
educational systems reproduced social inequalities and that changing this situa-
tion was either difficult (if favoured social groups design the system, as in 
Bourdieu and Passeron) or illusory (due to more systemic causes, as the very 
                                                             
2  Cobweb models were developed where first enrollments at university are assumed to be 
influenced by expected relative wages, while there is a production lag between the entry 
and the time of graduation (supply and demand conditions influencing the equilibrium wage 
of graduates). This leads to cycles and movements of over- or under-investments in specific 
fields of studies. See Siow, 1984 for a full-fledged analysis for the Law schools. 
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structure of educational systems, organized as trees with nodes where choices 
have to be made, and where less favored groups than to self-select in less re-
warding orientations due to cost-benefit calculations by the families). 
4. The 80s-90s: Optimism Back Again 
The 80s saw the revival of a vivid growth theory literature with the pioneering 
works of Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988). This is what has been called 
endogenous growth theory to compare it with the growth theory of the 50s and 
60s which was an exogenous theory of growth as growth rates per capita could 
only peter out unless one introduces an exogenous growth rate of technological 
change (not explained in the model). The new growth theories will try to ex-
plain sustained growth rates by making the investment choices in human capi-
tal (in the 60s the human capital literature was mostly disconnected from the 
growth literature) or in R&D endogenous. All these activities were now con-
sidered as economic because they entail costs (they are not free) and will gen-
erate benefits. These new growth theories can be divided into two categories 
depending on whether the stock or the accumulation of human capital matters 
for growth. In the latter case, human capital is just considered as another factor 
of production, whose accumulation is good for growth. In his seminal paper, 
Lucas (1988), for example, developed this philosophy, adding just an external-
ity linked with the average level of human capital in the population (making all 
firms more productive, ceteris paribus). This externality introduced a gap be-
tween the decentralized and centralized equilibriums, rendering some state 
intervention desirable to narrow the gap between the individual and social 
calculations concerning the optimal level of human capital. The other philoso-
phy of growth models stress the role of the stock of human capital (capitalizing 
in a sense on the pioneering paper by Nelson and Phelps, 1966) in the process 
of imitation or innovation (a higher stock of human capital leading to a higher 
rate of adoption, diffusion of existing technologies or innovation, leading to 
growth) (Romer, 1990).  
These early developments of the endogenous growth literature were mainly 
theoretical. The first empirical studies of the early 90s tended to confirm the 
positive role played by education on economic growth (Barro, 1991), even if 
the theoretical underpinnings of such exercises were not always the new en-
dogenous growth paradigm. One can indeed think about the positive role of 
education to growth through the lens of an enlarged exogenous growth model à 
la Solow considering a broad measure of capital including human capital, 
where the accumulation of factors of production exerts a steady decreasing 
positive impact on production due to decreasing returns (so that at one point it 
is no more rewarding to accumulate further than what is necessary to compen-
sate for depreciation of existing capital) (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). In 
this model, like in the Solow one, the only source of growth (besides popula-
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tion growth) is technological change whose rate of change is considered ex-
ogenous. If all economies face the same growth rate of technological progress 
(because technology is available everywhere at no cost), they will end up by 
growing at the same rate (this is the famous convergence debate) but their level 
of wealth can still diverge. For example, if specific economies allocate every 
year more resources to education, they will have a bigger stock of education 
than the others and they will produce more (Gurgand, 2005). 
At this period (mid-90s), it is mainly an accumulation model that seemed to 
receive an empirical support: more human capital (growth rate of scholarly 
level) generates more growth. This is also a quantitative philosophy supporting 
policies aiming at expanding educational systems and the number of graduates 
(as during the 60s). As stated by Gurgand (2005): “if produced wealth, Y, 
depends mechanically (with a given technology) upon the stock of human 
capital E, then, ceteris paribus, a country whose stock E grow more rapidly will 
also grow more rapidly”. 
A very simple empirical strategy to test this relation consists in relating at 
time t GDP per capita with the accumulated stocks of E and K (physical capi-
tal) at this stage: 
log Yt = m + a.log Et + b.logKt 
Taking first differences one obtains the (approximate) growth rates of the vari-
ables: 
(log Yt - log Yt-1) = a.(log Et - log Et-1) + b.(log Kt - log Kt-1) 
If one follows the estimated coefficients obtained by Barro (1991) or Mankiw 
et. al. (1992), the shift from a participation rate at secondary level from 50 to 
100% (approximately the one observed in the French education system from 
1960 to 1985) should have increased the growth rate by one point of percentage 
(Gurgand, 2004). In many countries, this led to a renewed faith in the necessity 
of expanding the participation to secondary and higher education. In France for 
example, Chevènement proposed at the late 80s that 80% of a class-age get the 
baccalauréat, i.e. the degree consecrating the end of high school and opening 
the doors to higher education institutions (Deer and Demeulemeester, 2004). 
Various policy memoranda (e.g. the White Paper by the European Commission 
called Learning and Teaching in the Information Society, 1995) called forth 
important reforms in a sector now viewed as central for the competitiveness of 
nations. 
Reforms were not only viewed in terms of a quantitative expansion but also 
qualitative changes. In the economic literature as well, new concerns of a more 
qualitative or institutional nature emerged. Economists as Murphy, Vishny and 
Shleifer (1991) demonstrated that not all disciplines are equally worthwhile in 
terms of contribution to growth. They even comment their econometric estima-
tions by noting that “engineers are good for growth and lawyers are bad for 
growth”. On a more theoretical perspective, the views of the Neo-Institutional 
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school (as North, 1990) led economists to re-think the link between supply and 
demand of human capital. They remind us that the demand for specific skills 
and competencies cannot be thought in abstracto but have to be understood 
within a broader institutional context, i.e. a set of rules of the game, informal 
and formal norms influencing behavior and choices and that have partly been 
inherited from the past due to path dependence. These rules were often de-
signed a long time ago to solve static coordination problems, reduce transaction 
costs, but without considering their long term impact in terms of incentives to 
perform such or such tasks. Human societies have adopted a huge array of 
distinctive institutions to solve rather similar problems, but their long run im-
pacts were different. Institutions do indeed have an impact on growth through 
the incentives they create (both for individuals and organizations, those groups 
of people emerging to put forward and advance their specific interests given the 
specific sets of rules they face). In some societies, adopted institutions were 
such that they promote wealth-enhancing activities, leading to a demand for 
human capital in this direction favorable for growth. On the contrary, in other 
societies, institutions will favor rent-seeking activities, leading people to invest 
in non-productive but nevertheless individually remunerative activities (and 
skills) as theology or law3. In the long run those societies will have lower 
growth rates (even if at each period of time demand and supply of human capi-
tal perfectly clear). This neo-institutional perspective tends to show that history 
matters, and that the analyst should take the precise institutional context of a 
country into account. Laisser faire solution (regarding investments in human 
capital) can be non-optimal simply because the overall institutional framework 
favors more rent-seeking than wealth-enhancing activities. This philosophy of 
research led to a revival of systemic or economic historical approaches, 
enlightened by economic theory or game theory while paying attention to the 
more traditional institutional approaches of the traditional historian (see Greif, 
1997 on the New Institutional History and Demeulemeester and Diebolt, 2007 
on cliometrics at large). These approaches have allowed economists to enrich 
their originally very crude view on the link between human capital (and educa-
tion) and growth, based upon simplistic growth models (very aggregate and 
suggesting only “one size fits all policies”). One key message of those new 
historical approaches was indeed that the mere equilibrium between supply and 
demand of human capital may not be optimal. Historical studies (Guagnini, 
1993) have shown that the slow development of an academic engineering edu-
cation in England at the end of the 19th century could be traced back to both 
the anti-utilitarian bias of the established academic institutions (as Oxford and 
                                                             
3  This is not to say that lawyers are only adverse to growth. They also produce institutional 
devices that favour economic activities as well. But this is a question of balance and a soci-
ety cannot afford to induce all its investments in human capital in this sole direction, as 
wealth has to be produced. 
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Cambridge) and the anti-academic bias of employers who favored more “on the 
job training” forms of education even if experts rapidly perceived the short-
comings of such an approach to face the competitive pressure of new emerging 
industrial powers as Germany (the latter having developed a very comprehen-
sive set of engineering schools with the support of the State, see Demeule-
meester and Diebolt, 2008; Gispen, 1989). If the laisser faire attitude of the 
English authorities can have played a negative role in these developments, 
historical studies have also shown that where the State intervened, it was not 
necessarily optimal. For example, both in France and Prussia, the State had 
established engineering schools that served mainly the needs of the civil ser-
vice (or the army), but not necessarily the needs of the emerging private sector 
(leading to new, private, institutions outside the realm of the public sector). 
One key message of these historical approaches can be that mere supply-side 
approaches (“increase the stock of human capital and get automatically higher 
growth”) are not necessarily optimal. It can be useful to produce engineers but 
the state of the economy should be such that it employs the graduates (the 
demand of human capital had to be taken into account; other policies – indus-
trial one, for example – may be complementary to human capital policies), the 
institutions should be favorable to growth enhancing activities. State interven-
tions can help as laisser faire solutions cannot guarantee a necessary institu-
tional change for example (even if at the same time too precise monitoring of 
the development process by the State can be harmful to growth, simply because 
it does not possess the relevant precise information to make the best decisions). 
Some economic historians have also suggested a non-linear relation between 
human capital and growth as threshold have to be attained (e.g. economic and 
technological, but it can also be a certain density of graduates in the country) 
before the development of education can promote growth (see Mitch, 1990). If 
early theoretical works (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) have introduced this idea 
of threshold, the idea will receive considerable new attention by the Neo-
Schumpeterian approaches of economic growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  
5. The 90s and Early-2000s: the Consensus under Attack 
We have already put forward that the first empirical analyses of the early 90s 
(where the growth rate of the stock of human capital was approximated by 
schooling rates) tended to confirm the belief in the positive role of expanding 
education (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil used the same database as Barro (1991) but in a traditional Solow model 
(1956) context including this time human capital (they introduce human capital 
accumulation through the use of schooling rates). For them, the differences in 
terms of savings, education and population growth explain the differences in 
GDP per capita. Their classical model with exogenous technological change 
and decreasing returns seems to better explain international variations of output 
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per capita than the newly developed endogenous growth models. Barro and 
Lee (1993) studied the success rates in education of the adult population at 
different levels (population without education, with primary education, secon-
dary education and higher education) for 129 countries between 1960 and 1985 
and concluded that education produces direct positive effects on the growth 
rates of GDP. 
However, some criticism began to appear concerning the virtue of the mas-
sive expansion of higher education (in pure quantitative terms, without deeper 
concerns on the composition of this expansion, for example). The model of 
accumulation that was part of the consensus was now under attack, thanks also 
to the availability of new and better data concerning the stock of human capital. 
If the first estimations approximated the growth of the stock of human capital 
using schooling participation rates (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992), other 
papers were now using a direct measure of this growth of education in the 
population (approximated by years of schooling) (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; 
Pritchett, 2001). Changes appeared: statistically significant coefficients for the 
variable education did not appear when one used these better proxies. For Ben-
habib and Spiegel (1994), the growth rate of human capital measured by the 
average years of schooling in the active population was no more a significant 
explanatory variable of the growth of output per capita. However the levels of 
human capital seemed to play a key role in explaining growth rates of output 
per capita. It was therefore no more possible to consider human capital just as 
another factor of production, because the latter assumption implies that it is its 
growth rate and not its level that should explain the growth rate of output per 
capita.  
The message that comes from those empirical studies was rather fuzzy. If 
the first empirical analyses seemed to confirm the link between education and 
growth in the context of an accumulation model, they used a rather crude proxy 
of the growth of human capital (schooling rates). As soon as one relied upon a 
direct measure of this growth, this effect disappeared (and tended to be linked 
to the change of proxy for the variable education). As put forward by Gurgand 
(2005, p. 79), “the best measure does not allow us to put forward a link from 
the growth rate of the education level to the growth rate of GDP in the context 
of an accumulation model”. 
We already note in this review that older papers as Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) had suggested that it was the stock of human capital itself rather than its 
growth rate that might positively impact growth, through its effect on imitation, 
adoption and diffusion of new technology. More recent papers in the spirit of 
endogenous growth literature also gave a key role to the stock of human capital 
in the growth rate of technological change (innovation) and by the way in the 
growth rate of the economy (Romer, 1990). More empirical studies will give 
some credibility to this thesis, with an underlying debate on the differentiated 
role of education (human capital) on growth depending upon the level of de-
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velopment attained by the country (for historical discussions see Mitch, 1990; 
Demeulemeester and Rochat, 1994). One should note here the key importance 
of the pioneering paper by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) that showed that in the 
richest countries the stock of human capital, i.e. the direct effect of education, 
tends to play a key role on innovation and therefore growth whereas in the 
poorer countries there is a catch-up effect. The latter effect is approximated 
using a catch-up potential variable as the gap between the income per capita of 
the country and the one of the most advanced economy. “The estimated effect 
of education is then proportional to this gap: a positive coefficient confirms that 
education fosters growth the more so the catch-up potential is big” (Gurgand, 
2005, p. 80). 
Table 1: Determinants of the Growth Rates of GDP, Models of Accumulation 
Articles Coefficient on education Proxy for education other variables 
Barro, 1991 0.0181 Primary  schooling rates 1960 
Barro, 1991 0.0225 Secondary  schooling rates 1960 
GDP in 1960, invest-
ment rate, share of 
public expenditures, 
political stability, 
deviation vis-à-vis PPP 
index 
Mankiw et al., 1992 0.233 
Log of secondary 
schooling rates in 
percentage of the adult 
population  
(average 1960-1985) 
GDP in 1960, 
investment rate 
Benhabib/Spiegel, 1994 -0.059 
Growth rate of the 
average number of 
schooling years  
in the active population 
GDP in 1960, 
growth of capital stock 
Pritchett, 2001 -0.38 
Growth rate of the 
average number of 
schooling years  
in the active population 
GDP in 1960, 
growth of capital stock 
Source: Table 11, Gurgand, 2005, p. 78. Coefficients in italics are not statistically different 
from zero. 
Table 2: Determinants of the Growth Rate of GDP, 
Innovation and Adoption Models 
Education variable All countries 1/3 richest 1/3 poorest 
E -0.0136 0.0439 -0.0736 
E x (Ymax/Y) 0.0011 0.0003 0.0012 
Source: Table 12 in Gurgand, 2005. The education variable E is measured by the average 
number of years of education in the active population (averaged on the period); the other 
variables present in the regression are GDP in 1960 and the growth rate of the stock of physi-
cal capital. Estimation standardised by population size. The coefficients in italics are not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  
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The analysis by Benhabib and Spiegel is interesting even if it used very imper-
fect data, and even if it remains rather crude (based upon stylized relations 
leaving no room for the country heterogeneity). But other analyses will cor-
roborate their intuitions. It seems indeed true that better educated people can 
benefit more from technological change (see Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996 on 
the Green Revolution in the Indian districts between 1969 and 1982), or that 
more educated people learn faster (see Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987, showing 
that demand for skilled manpower is higher the more recent is the technology 
introduced in the firm). An implicit idea here is that education does not exert 
the same effect in all contexts, and that this effect could change depending on 
the level of development or whether the country/firm faces or not a period of 
technological change. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) put forward in their survey 
that “education is statistically significantly and positively associated with sub-
sequent growth only for the countries with the lowest level of education”.  
Considering all these puzzling developments in the empirical literature, two 
avenues of research unfolded. The first one tried to set up better data sets, more 
systematic and with less errors (De la Fuente and Domenech, 2002). One can 
wonder indeed whether the empirical evidence in favour of this imita-
tion/innovation model rather than an accumulation model was not simply a 
statistical artifact. All econometricians know that a large measurement error on 
a variable risks to weaken artificially its correlation coefficient with other vari-
ables. Gurgand (2005) put forward that  
the noise around the education variable weakens the observed link with GDP 
as the measurement error can make E bigger or lower independently from 
GDP. This phenomenon becomes even worse when one uses growth rates of E 
as measurement errors compound. 
This could perfectly explain why the estimation results of the link between the 
growth rates of education and GDP are less good than the ones observed be-
tween the mere stock of education and growth. Empirical works have been 
carried out following this line of thought, obtaining a renewed confirmation of 
the link between growth rates of education and GDP (De la Fuente and Dome-
nech, 2002 on OECD countries). A complementary way of dealing with the 
problem is to find better proxies to represent human capital. The measurement 
of the education level of populations through the use of schooling years is at 
the same time convenient and restrictive (for example: how seriously compare 
the quality of a given number of years of education between two countries?). 
Analyses have been carried out to explicitly take into account real skills and 
competencies. For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) used survey data on 
sciences and mathematics test scores (as the standardized tests of IEA or IAEP; 
see the OECD Pisa studies). They use them to build indexes combined with the 
active population (by comparing the precise realization dates of those tests with 
the age structure of the population). They obtain significant results as the coun-
tries where people have the best test scores also faced higher growth rates from 
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1960 to 1990. Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) have also tried to proxy the 
skills and competencies of the manpower directly rather than use the education 
proxies.  
The second avenue of research consists in integrating directly in the theo-
retical structure a possible heterogeneity of the impact of education on growth 
depending on the level of development (capitalizing on Benhabib and Spiegel 
results and economic historical intuitions). The use of a concept of distance to 
the technological frontier within the framework of endogenous growth models 
will be developed by the so-called Neo-Schumpeterian approach à la Aghion 
(see Aghion and Howitt, 1998, 2005).  
6. The Neo-Schumpeterian Approaches 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) developed a Neo-Schumpeterian endogenous model 
of growth with destructive creation. In this seminal paper, the succeeding inno-
vator captures the market and replaces the incumbent monopolist, reaping all 
the monopoly rents, a powerful incentive to invest in R&D indeed. He/she is 
himself in a contestable position, and in his/her calculations he will take into 
account the expected period during which he/she will keep his/her monopoly 
power before being replaced by new innovative entrepreneurs. These authors 
give to innovation a central place in explaining growth processes, and it is 
linked to the share of the manpower affected to research activities (as in Ro-
mer, 1990, but the latter did not introduce the idea of creative destruction). On 
the basis of the philosophy of this first paper, the neo-schumpeterians have 
explored a whole array of issue (see the textbook by Aghion and Howitt, 1998), 
including education. In a more recent paper, Vandenbussche, Aghion and 
Meghir (2006) have built a model (accompanied by an empirical test) where 
they stress the importance of either imitation/adoption or innovation activities 
depending on the level of development of the countries (one finds here a cri-
tique of the “one size fits all policies” implied by the older models). Both ac-
tivities use skilled and unskilled labor, but the former is more intensive in un-
skilled (less educated) workers whereas the reverse is true for the latter (higher 
education degrees are more important for innovation). For countries far away 
from the technological frontier they show that as adoption of existing technolo-
gies are more central (more remunerative), the development of pri-
mary/secondary education is of utmost importance (not so much higher educa-
tion). On the contrary, for countries at or near the technological frontiers, 
innovation matters much more and therefore higher education becomes central 
for growth. This paper contributes to solve the debate around the apparent less 
important role of education for more developed economies (or, that education 
matters more for lagging countries). A simplistic view was that as education 
favors the adoption of existing technologies, the role of this variable becomes 
less important the closer the country is from the technological frontier (Nelson 
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and Phelps, 1966). Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) stress that the 
sources of technological change are actually dual: imitation and pure innova-
tion (the latter being more important for the advanced countries). Technologi-
cal advances result from a mix of imitation and innovation (as in Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 1994 or Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002). For them, it is not 
solely the distance vis-à-vis the technological frontier that matters for a country 
but also the composition of its stock of human capital. If, ceteris paribus, the 
increase of the stock of human capital is always favorable, on the other hand, 
keeping its level constant, the capacity of human capital to favor growth de-
pends both on the distance to the frontier and its composition, as stated above. 
For countries near the technological frontier, the catch-up potential is reduced 
and therefore innovation matters much more (and so qualified manpower, high-
level human capital). In their empirical analysis the authors approximated the 
distance to the technological frontier by the ratio of total factor productivity in 
the country under study and the one observed in the US. For our advanced 
economies it would be no more the increase of human capital lato sensu that 
matters most but the highest levels (“top of the top”4). Econometric analyses on 
the refined databases (as the one of De la Fuente and Domenech, 2002: 22 
OECD countries from 1960 to 2000) (panel data) tended to confirm this idea 
(Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir, 2006). 
The positive sign on the variable of interaction between the proximity to-
wards the technological frontier and the proportion of adults with higher educa-
tion degrees confirms the idea that the proportion of people with higher educa-
tion degrees is more important for countries close to the technological frontier. 
One also notes that for countries with a higher proportion of skilled workers 
(with higher education) the lagged effect of the proximity to the frontier on 
growth is less negative. The introduction of dummy variables to account for 
specific (non-observable) country groups effects (close either geographically or 
institutionally) on growth in regression 2 (table 3) leads us to define a threshold 
level (above which one gets a positive impact of higher education on growth) 
of a productivity level bigger than 60% of the frontier level. 
Aghion will diffuse such ideas with key policy implications in a series of 
memoranda and policy papers (Sapir Report for the European Commission in 
2003; Cohen and Aghion report for France in 2004…). This will foster a vivid 
policy debate (not to speak of the influence on the so-called European-wide 
Lisbon Strategy aiming at transforming the EU in the most competitive knowl-
edge-based economy in the world up to 2010). Two natural questions arise: is 
this Neo-Schumpeterian approach unquestionable? Is it feasible in pure politi-
cal terms? 
                                                             
4  For a recent survey on the importance of the higher levels of human capital for growth see 
section 2.4.1 in Minne et al., 2007. Besides some econometric discussions, Hanushek and 
Woesmann (2007) demonstrated a strong impact of the latter on growth. 
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Table 3: Equation of TFP Growth 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 
Proximity -0.17 (.044) *** -0.31 (0.063) *** 
Fraction  
(% of adults with tertiary degree) 0.134 (0.06) ** 0.427 (0.146) *** 
Proximity x Fraction 0.629 (0.29) ** 1.06 (0.28) *** 
Dummies for countries (groups) - Groupes 
Threshold -0.213 (0.11) -0.403 (0.052) 
Source: Table 4 in Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir, 2006, p. 114. Methods: instrumental 
variables (IV). 
7. An Unquestionable Approach? 
If an empirical validation was included in the Vandenbussche, Aghion and 
Meghir (2006) paper on OECD data, one could nevertheless question the very 
aggregate, macroeconomic approach (with underlying unrealistic assumptions, 
as underlined by Aghion and Howitt themselves). They can easily lead to me-
chanical policy responses such as expanding higher education (for example at 
the PhD levels). One can wonder which types of degrees should be precisely 
promoted to foster growth (in the line of Murphy, Vishny and Shleifer, 1991). 
These approaches are very supply-side, thought in a long run perspective. The 
time span for policy makers can be shorter and adjustment can take time (in-
cluding risks of short run overeducation problems). The demand side is partly 
ignored. One could wonder whether an education policy should not be thought 
simultaneously with other (industrial) policies. The Aghion and Howitt frame-
work (2005) allow them to address the issue of optimal institutions or policies 
one at the time but not simultaneously. Here again, we can only stress the po-
tentials of more economic historical (Sanderson, 1999; Fox and Guagnini, 
1993…) or systemic approaches (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Finegold, 1999) 
(see above). It is the more true that the empirical analyses too often focus on 
very contemporary periods (e.g. since the 60s). However, the robustness of an 
economic argument should be checked in the long run. If we turn to economic 
history we can only note that the correlation between high levels of education 
and sustained growth was not always evident during the 19th century (perform-
ance of the British or Belgian economies without even primary compulsory 
education before the beginning of the 20th century; and high performance of 
agricultural economies and export-countries as Argentina or Australia prior the 
WW1). One can of course question the relevance of high investments in human 
capital (especially at the university levels) for supporting technological innova-
tion and growth during most of the 19th century. Some authors as well as con-
temporary observers tended nevertheless to think that it was only with the 
second industrial revolution (chemistry, electricity, cars…) that technological 
education began to matter. During this period the UK faced fierce economic 
competition with Germany and the US (both countries characterized by in-
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creased efforts vis-à-vis their education systems), and a lot of British authors 
accused the deficient organization of the British system of educating its élite 
(as well as the absence of academic technological education) as one of the 
factor contributing to the British economic decline (Guagnini, 1993, p. 27). The 
successes of Germany and the US during the same period tend to support in a 
sense the Aghion theses. Both countries invest a lot in their higher education 
systems. Germany developed a network of Technische Hochschulen to train a 
large number of engineers urgently needed (Gispen, 1989), while in the USA 
academic institutions faced deep transformations between 1870 and 1914 
(Donovan, 1993), leading some authors to suggest that this element should be 
taken into account besides technological change and the emergence of the 
Modern Business Enterprise in explaining the strong rise of TFP from 1872-
1906 – see Demeulemeester, 2009). As already put forward, the idea that a high 
skill strategy alone could lead to sustained growth should be mitigated by the 
importance of other complementary policies as well. The example of commu-
nist economies (as the Soviet-Union from 1917 to 1991) that invest massively 
in their human capital but within a context of suboptimal policies in other do-
mains should be clear to all economists.  
8. An Approach that is Politically Feasible? 
It is not because economists demonstrate that specific policies or reforms are 
necessary that they will necessarily be implemented. Reforming education 
systems means also reforming institutions, and we have already stressed that it 
is difficult due to path-dependence (not to speak of vested interests opposing 
change). In a world of benevolent dictators, it can be easier (as we have shown 
in the context of the Prussian higher education at the early 19th century with no 
universal suffrage and a large discretion left to those in powers, even if like in 
other European countries in the 19th century, the élite itself could be divided), 
but even if initial reforms are feasible, the subsequent changes cannot remain 
so easily under the central authority’s influence (for the Prussian case see De-
meulemeester and Diebolt, 2008; Gispen, 1989). In most 20th century coun-
tries, education systems are run by the State so that any reform implies the 
democratic process. A new literature arises therefore on the political economy 
of educational reforms (Gradstein, Justman and Meier, 2005).  
We already stress in this paper that during the 19th century some countries 
(as UK) had suffered from the lack of responsiveness of their education sys-
tems to economic needs, and that even if various actors were aware of this 
situation, change was difficult (and slow) to be implemented. We stressed the 
laisser faire context in England, with very few interventions of the State, and 
key actors determining demand and supply of human capital very reluctant to 
change their perceptions and usual ways of educating e.g. engineers (Guagnini, 
1993). Formal engineering education was both dismissed by employers prefer-
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ring on the job training and universities not interested in applied dimensions of 
science, and developed only very slowly, even if the country as a whole suf-
fered from increasing competition from countries having reformed their own 
educational systems. This lack of reactivity in terms of education reforms is a 
kind of leitmotiv in the British economic history (Sanderson, 1999). This is not 
to say that in all circumstances actors ignore their interests and that a laisser 
faire system could not work sometimes. In France, long before the formal 
institutionalization of the Ferry’s Laws, primary education diffused, both in 
terms of supply (building of schools) and demand (increasing participation 
rates). The higher returns to education let families, local authorities and firms 
invest in education well before the intervention of the central state (Diebolt, 
Jaoul and Martino, 2005). On the other side, when the State directly intervenes 
and sets up new institutions, it is not always optimal. Sometimes (as in Prussia 
in the early 19th century) new institutions are established too early and do not 
respond yet to economic needs. They can also be ill-designed or simply de-
signed to respond to the sole needs of the Army or the civil service. The private 
sector had to establish new schools outside the realm of the State. Some opti-
mal combination of private initiatives and (publicly controlled) competition (as 
between federal states in the new united German Empire after 1871) could lead 
to better results. Recent researches (Galor and Moav, 2006, Galor, forthcom-
ing) show that when productive complementarities between physical and hu-
man capital exist, as was the case in England during the second wave of Indus-
trial Revolution, capitalists can support reforms to increase the human capital 
of the workers (even without universal suffrage) as was the case with primary 
education in England during the second half of the 19th century. Other studies, 
more centered on 20th century examples, tend to show that the elaborative 
structures (decentralized or not, see Archer, 1982) are very important in ex-
plaining success or failure (and also the types of reforms more likely to suc-
ceed). Deer (2003) and Demeulemeester (2009) have compared England and 
France from 1980 onwards and showed how the centralized nature of the 
French educational system rendered reforms difficult (so the necessary pre-
liminary move towards decentralization and creation of competition between 
universities) while in England the network of autonomous universities were 
more likely to be driven by the State (especially when they mainly rely upon 
public funding and that the latter is reduced and increasingly made conditional 
to the attainment of specific objectives set by the State).  
Conclusion 
The relation between education and growth is not an easy topic. Various logical 
structures (growth models of various types) can be envisaged to think about 
this relation mathematically, stressing either human capital as just another 
factor of production whose accumulation accounts for growth (impact in the 
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transitory dynamics for exogenous growth models; permanent impact in the 
case of endogenous models of accumulation as in Lucas, 1988) or the stock 
itself of human capital as a facilitator of imitation, adoption, diffusion or even 
innovation of new technologies. Various empirical strategies have been de-
signed in order to test the relevance of those various theoretical models and to 
assess the degree of importance of the stock of human capital or its growth on 
the growth rate of the economy. Problems of data reliability and quality but 
also the nature of the proxy used led to lots of debates. At the turn of the cen-
tury, in the early 2000s, a vague of skepticism reawaked due to empirical evi-
dence concerning a weak link between education and growth in the developed 
countries. The idea that education might not exert the same impact on growth 
depending on the distance of the country to the technological frontier gained 
some credentials. First suggested by empirical studies (Benhabib and Spiegel, 
1994) and economic historical studies (Mitch, 1990), it received considerable 
attention by pioneering researchers in the philosophy of Neo-Schumpeterian 
growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998, 2005). In a recent paper, 
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) have demonstrated that for coun-
tries closer to the technological frontier, higher education will contribute more 
to growth than lower levels of education, as innovation (intensive in high-
skilled workers) is the key thing for those countries (imitation is no more an 
option). Confirmed by an econometric analysis on OECD countries, the im-
plicit message for the most advanced economies is that they should develop 
mainly their higher education systems (and its top tiers). This message is of 
course rather vague (what about the time dimension? the specific skills and 
competencies to develop? what about the risks of overeducation in the short run 
if the economic structures are not sufficiently developed to hire such top gradu-
ates?). Moreover the political feasibility of such long run policies in democra-
cies (characterized by a short-medium time horizon for politicians) is not evi-
dent. A new emerging literature on the political economy of educational 
reforms should help economists in the design of policies that are both optimal 
(conducive to growth) and politically acceptable. 
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